AN OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
1-1. An operational environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect
the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0). Commanders at all
levels have their own operational environments for their particular operations. An operational environment
for any specific operation comprises more than the interacting variables that exist within a specific physical
area. It also involves interconnected influences from the global or regional perspective (for example, politics
and economics) that impact on conditions and operations there. Thus, each commander’s operational
environment is part of a higher echelon commander’s operational environment.
1-2. Operational environments include considerations at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of
warfare. At the strategic level, leaders develop an idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of
national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) in a synchronized and integrated fashion
to accomplish national objectives. The operational level links the tactical employment of forces to national
and military strategic objectives, with the focus being on the design, planning, and conduct of operations
using operational art. (See chapter 2 for a discussion of operational art.) The tactical level of warfare involves
the employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other. The levels of warfare help
commanders visualize a logical arrangement of forces, allocate resources, and assign tasks based on a
strategic purpose, informed by the conditions within their operational environments.
1-3. Broad trends such as globalization, urbanization, technological advances, and failing states affect land
operations. These trends can create instability and contribute to an environment of persistent competition and
conflict. Persistent conflict is the protracted confrontation among state, nonstate, and individual actors willing
to use violence to achieve political and ideological ends. In such an operational environment, commanders
must seek and exploit opportunities for success. To exploit opportunities, commanders must thoroughly
understand the dynamic nature of their operational environment. Previous experience within a similar
operational environment is not enough to guarantee future mission success in the current one.
1-4. Threats seek to employ capabilities to create effects in multiple domains and the information
environment to counter U.S. interests and impede friendly operations. Their activities in the information
environment, space, and cyberspace attempt to influence U.S. decision makers and disrupt friendly
deployment of forces. Land-based threats will attempt to impede joint force freedom of action across the air,
land, maritime, space, and cyberspace domains. They will disrupt the electromagnetic spectrum, sow
confusion in the information environment, and challenge the legitimacy of U.S. actions. Understanding how
threats can present multiple dilemmas to Army forces in all domains helps Army commanders identify (or
create), seize, and exploit their own opportunities.
1-5. Some peer threats have nuclear and chemical weapons capabilities and the ability to employ such
weapons in certain situations. However, capability does not always equal intent to use, and it is generally
presumed that most would use restraint. Preparation and planning that takes nuclear and chemical weapons
capabilities into account is of paramount importance in any confrontation with an adversary armed with them.
Understanding threat nuclear and chemical weapons doctrine is important, particularly during large-scale
ground combat operations.
Chapter 1
1-2 ADP 3-0 31 July 2019
1-6. Nuclear terrorism remains a threat to the United States and to international security and stability.
Preventing the illicit acquisition of a nuclear weapon, nuclear materials, or related technology and expertise
by a violent extremist organization is a significant U.S. national security priority. The more states—
particularly rogue states—that possess nuclear weapons or the materials, technology, and knowledge required
to make them, the greater the potential risk of terrorist acquisition. Given the nature of terrorist ideologies,
commanders and staffs must assume that terrorists would employ a nuclear weapon were they to acquire one.
1-7. Large-scale ground combat operations can occur below the nuclear threshold, and they are not
synonymous with total war. Large-scale ground combat operations are sustained combat operations
involving multiple corps and divisions. Planning for large-scale ground combat operations against enemies
possessing nuclear weapons must account for the possibility of their use against friendly forces. The
operational approaches employed by joint force commanders (JFCs) may thus be constrained to avoid nuclear
escalation in terms of their geographic depth and the assigned objectives. Large-scale ground combat
operations, while potentially enormous in scale and scope, are typically limited by the law of war and the
political objectives of the conflict itself. Against nuclear armed enemies, the political objectives of a conflict
are also informed by the strategic risk inherent in escalation. While the scale and scope of conventional
conflict has been smaller than World War II since 1945, it retains its inherent lethality and complexity.
1-8. Successful operations against nuclear and chemically capable peer threats require units prepared to
react to the employment of those capabilities and operate degraded in contaminated environments. Planning
and training must include active and passive measures for protection against the effects of these weapons, as
well as techniques for mitigating their effects to preserve combat power. This includes greater emphasis on
dispersion, survivability, and regenerating communications between echelons. These requirements must be
incorporated into every facet of doctrine and training, so units and commanders are technically and
psychologically prepared for the environment they may encounter. Survivability in this environment should
be a training and readiness objective.
1-9. Modern information technology makes the information environment, which includes cyberspace and
the electromagnetic spectrum, indispensable to military operations. The information environment is the
aggregate of individuals, organizations, and systems that collect, process, disseminate, or act on information
(JP 3-13). It is a key part of any operational environment, and it will be simultaneously congested and
contested during operations. All actors in the information environment—enemy, friendly, or neutral—remain
vulnerable to attack by physical, psychological, cyber, or electronic means. (See JP 3-12 for more information
on cyberspace operations and the electromagnetic spectrum.)
1-10. No two operational environments are the same. An operational environment consists of many
relationships and interactions among interrelated variables. How entities and conditions interact within an
operational environment is often difficult to understand and requires continuous analysis. (See paragraphs
1-11. An operational environment continually evolves because of the complexity of human interaction and
how people learn and adapt. People’s actions change that environment. Some changes can be anticipated,
while others cannot. Some changes are immediate and apparent, while other changes evolve over time or are
extremely difficult to detect.
1-12. The complex and dynamic nature of an operational environment makes determining the relationship
between cause and effect difficult and contributes to the friction and uncertainty inherent in military
operations. Commanders must continually assess their operational environments and re-assess their
assumptions. Commanders and staffs use the Army design methodology, operational variables, and mission
variables to analyze an operational environment to support the operations process. (See paragraphs 4-7
through 4-8 for a discussion of the Army design methodology.)